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Balancing sovereignty and stability

On Morocco’s Mediterranean coast, the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla stand like European outposts in Africa. Far to the south, the sprawling desert of Western Sahara fuels a much bigger fight. These places are at the heart of a complicated relationship between Spain and Morocco, neighbours trying to keep the peace while clashing over who owns what.

Duncan Dickson Dyogo.
By: Admin ., Journalists @New Vision

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OPINION

By Duncan Dickson Dyogo

The 2022 Spain-Morocco deal brings short-term calm and cooperation, but it sidesteps the big questions about who controls Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara, leaving the Sahrawi people to face the heaviest consequences, including a slow, steady, silent ethnic cleansing under the international community’s watch.

On Morocco’s Mediterranean coast, the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla stand like European outposts in Africa. Far to the south, the sprawling desert of Western Sahara fuels a much bigger fight. These places are at the heart of a complicated relationship between Spain and Morocco, neighbours trying to keep the peace while clashing over who owns what. Since their 2022 diplomatic reset, they have struck deals to stay friendly, but the question of who gets Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara remains unanswered.

There is no clear swap of Morocco dropping its claims to the cities for Spain’s support on Western Sahara, but their agreement focuses on trade and security over border disputes.

While this keeps things calm for now, it is Western Sahara’s Sahrawi people who bear the brunt, facing what some call a slow, steady, silent ethnic cleansing as the world looks on. This article highlights the history, politics, people, and stakes, with a hard look at why the Sahrawis are paying the highest price.

Ceuta and Melilla: Spanish strongholds, Moroccan ambitions

Ceuta and Melilla are tiny towns spanning 18.5 km² and 12.3 km², respectively, but are big players in history and politics. According to Gold. P (2000)i in his book Europe or Africa: Contemporary study of the Spanish North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Ceuta joined Spain in 1668 after Portugal handed it over, having seized it in 1415, while Melilla has been Spanish since 1497, long before Morocco became a nation in 1956.

However, logically, it didn’t take Spanish colonialism for Morocco to become a nation for as long as the colonisers found some natives already settled. Ceuta’s 83,299 residents as of 2024 are about half Christian, half Muslim, with a few Sephardic Jews and Sindhi Hindus, while Melilla’s 86,487 people as of 2019 are 65% Christian, 30% Muslim, and home to a historic Jewish community. Spanish is the main language, but Moroccan Arabic (Darija) and Tarifit (a Berber language in Melilla) mix in, reflecting centuries of trade and migration.

As free ports, these cities thrive on low taxes, pulling in over €5 billion a year in trade with Morocco, exchanging goods such as clothes and electronics, among others, plus over €30 million in Spanish funding through various projects funded by the European Union.

Unemployment rates exceeding 30% disproportionately affect Muslim communities with ties to Morocco. Ceuta’s port handles 2.5 million tons of cargo yearly, keeping Mediterranean shipping alive, while Melilla’s 900+ modernist buildings, rivalling Barcelona’s, attract tourists, subsidising the economy. Both host Spanish military bases, guarding the Strait of Gibraltar, where 100,000 ships carry 10% of global trade each year.

Morocco has claimed sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla since 1956, viewing them as colonial leftovers like Gibraltar. Spain maintains their integral status, supported by local elections favouring pro-Spain parties and the UN’s exclusion of the enclaves from its non-self-governing territories list. Tensions flared in May 2021 when Morocco let 6,000 migrants – mostly young men from sub-Saharan Africa and Morocco – flood Ceuta in a day, likely a jab at Spain for treating Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali in a hospital.

In this scenario, the 6-meter razor-wire fences built with EU money saw 37 deaths in a 2022 Melilla clash, according to UN Experts who condemned the continued lack of accountability despite earlier calls for accountability in a press release by the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, sparking global outcry.

These events underscore the challenge of balancing sovereignty with humanitarian imperatives, a tension the 2022 framework seeks to mitigate through cooperation, though it avoids resolving Morocco’s claims. For Ceuta and Melilla’s residents, life goes on, but Western Sahara’s Sahrawis face a much harsher reality.

Western Sahara: A colonial wound unhealed

Western Sahara, a 266,000-km² former Spanish colony, is rich with phosphates (50% of the global reserves) and fishing grounds, generating $8 billion a year into Morocco’s economy according to the 2024 World Bank report. Spain ran it as a colony from 1884 until 1975, when it signed the Madrid Accords, handing control to Morocco and Mauritania without asking the Sahrawi people, a move the UN called out for ignoring their right to choose.

Mauritania withdrew in 1979, but Morocco holds 80% of the land to date, guarded by a 2,700-km sand wall packed with mines and sensors. The Polisario Front, supported by Algeria, established the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and continues to fight for its independence. They are recognised by over 80 countries, mostly in Africa and Latin America, but lack UN General Assembly membership despite having full membership in the African Union (AU).

The UN calls Western Sahara a non-self-governing territory, pushing for a vote on independence that’s been stalled since a 1991 ceasefire over voter eligibility. In 2007, Morocco’s autonomy plan, offering self-rule under its control, got a boost when the US recognised its claim in 2020, linked to the Abraham Accords, a move that has been greatly contested by Former US National Security Adviser and UN Ambassador John Bolton, calling on the US to support the referendum.

Spain’s 2022 endorsement of the plan as “the most serious, realistic, and credible” marked a policy shift, aligning with Morocco to amend relations post-2021 Ceuta crisis. This hit the Sahrawis like a ton of bricks. The Polisario Front called it a “betrayal,” accusing Spain of abandoning its duty as the former colonial power, and stepped up attacks after the 1991 ceasefire collapsed in 2020 (Polisario Front, 2022). In the same regard, Algeria, a Polisario ally, recalled its Ambassador and cut €1 billion in trade with Spain, though it eased up in 2024 with some gas exports.

The Sahrawis are caught in the crossfire, facing what activists and some observers call a slow, steady, silent ethnic cleansing. Over 173,600 live in Algeria’s Tindouf camps, packed into tents in the scorching desert, surviving on UN aid that fell $10 million short in 2024, according to the UNHCR 2024 report.

In 2024, Amnesty International reported that in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, Sahrawis face crackdowns – arrests, beatings, and bans on protests pushing for independence, documenting over 50 detained activists. Morocco has encouraged thousands of settlers to move in, shifting demographics: Sahrawis are now a minority in cities like Laayoune, where they make up less than 40% of the population. Their culture–language, nomadic traditions, and identity are eroding as schools teach Moroccan curricula and Arabic over Hassaniya, the Sahrawi dialect.

Morocco’s income from phosphates and slightly over a million tons of fish yearly enriches its economy, while Sahrawis see little, often excluded from jobs in these industries. The international community, including Spain and the EU, has largely stood by, prioritising deals with Morocco over the Sahrawis’ rights. The 2022 deal’s focus on stability leaves them stranded, their hope for a homeland fading as global powers look the other way.

The 2022 Framework: Stability over Resolution

In 2022, Spain and Morocco signed a deal in Rabat to keep things friendly, focusing on trade and security instead of fighting over Ceuta, Melilla, or Western Sahara. Here is the breakdown:

  1. Ceuta and Melilla: The deal pushes “mutual respect” for borders, meaning Morocco is cooling its claims for now, though not giving them up. Morocco reopened Melilla’s customs post, closed since 2018, and set up one in Ceuta, boosting billions in annual Spain is spending an estimated €711 million (2023 - 2026) to upgrade Ceuta’s port and Melilla’s border, trying to cut smuggling, which is about 20% of local trade. This keeps life steady for locals, unlike the Sahrawis’ struggle.

  2. Western Sahara: Spain’s support for Morocco’s autonomy plan gives Morocco a stronger hand in the EU, where Spain backs trade deals on Western Sahara’s fish (€50 million a year) and phosphates, despite Polisario lawsuits claiming these belong to the Sahrawis. Morocco’s tighter patrols cut migrant crossings into Ceuta and Melilla by 40% in 2023, a win for Spain. But for the Sahrawis, it’s a raw deal – Spain’s move greenlights Morocco’s control.

  3. Economic and Security Ties: Joint patrols in the Strait of Gibraltar, with EU help, tackle smuggling, terrorism, and control sub-Saharan illegal migration into Europe, thus entrusting Morocco with the role of Europe’s policeman in Africa. Morocco’s phosphate and fish exports rely on EU deals, with Spain helping dodge Polisario legal challenges. This keeps money flowing for both, but Western Sahara’s resources enrich Morocco while the Sahrawis get nothing.



This setup keeps things calm, but it leaves sovereignty issues unresolved. By dodging the ownership fight, it leaves the Sahrawis facing cultural erosion and displacement, with the world barely blinking.

Challenges and global reactions

Morocco hasn’t let go of Ceuta and Melilla as evidenced in a 2023 parliament speech calling them “occupied,” keeping national pride alive. The relationship between Ceuta, Melilla, and Morocco is complex, with many Moroccans crossing the border daily to work in these Spanish enclaves. Despite this economic connection, the residents of Ceuta and Melilla have historically identified with Spain, often supporting parties that uphold Spanish sovereignty.

The demographic makeup of these cities also sheds light on their cultural identity. In Melilla, about 65% of the population identifies as Christian, while in Ceuta, this figure is around 50%. These numbers contribute to the cities’ strong pro-Spain stance, as is evident in their electoral choices.

The reliance on Morocco for labour highlights the intricate economic relationship between the two nations, but the voting patterns underscore the residents’ political and cultural affinity with Spain.

This situation underscores the multifaceted nature of the relationship between Ceuta, Melilla, Spain, and Morocco, where economic needs and political loyalties intersect in complex ways. Nevertheless, they are shielded from the worst, unlike Western Sahara.

The Polisario Front strongly criticised Spain’s move, viewing it as a betrayal that escalated tensions after the 1991 ceasefire collapsed in 2020. Algeria, a key supporter of the Polisario, had previously severed trade ties with Spain due to heightened tensions but began to mend relations in 2024, resuming some gas exports. This development suggests a potential easing of diplomatic tensions and renewed economic cooperation.

Within the EU, there is a divide on the Western Sahara issue, with some countries like France and Spain backing Morocco’s autonomy plan, while others advocate for a UN-led approach that prioritises international law. The UN’s MINURSO mission, with a limited staff, works to monitor the ceasefire but faces challenges in advancing the peace process, particularly given Morocco’s stance against independence.

Migration remains a contentious issue, highlighted by a tragic incident that resulted in significant loss of life. Meanwhile, the Sahrawi people face substantial challenges, including displacement, repression, and cultural erosion, as their situation remains overshadowed by international diplomatic and economic interests in Morocco.

Economic and strategic stakes

The strategic importance of Ceuta and Melilla extends beyond their economic reliance on Spanish aid and trade. These territories play a crucial role in NATO’s military presence and global maritime security, particularly in the Strait of Gibraltar, which sees a high volume of international shipping. However, the economic benefits and geopolitical significance of these territories are juxtaposed with the challenges faced by their local populations, including high unemployment and limited economic opportunities.

In Western Sahara, Morocco’s control over the territory’s resources, particularly phosphates and fisheries, is a significant economic driver. The region’s phosphate reserves are among the world’s largest, and the fishing industry is a crucial sector for Morocco’s economy. However, the exploitation of these resources is contentious, with the Polisario Front and Sahrawi people arguing that they should benefit from their own natural resources.

The dynamic between Morocco’s economic interests and the Sahrawis’ aspirations for self-determination is complex. While Morocco views the territory as an integral part of its kingdom, the Sahrawis see it as their homeland, which has been occupied since the 1970s. The international community’s approach to this issue has been criticised for prioritising stability and economic interests over the rights and aspirations of the Sahrawi people.

This tension is reflected in the agreements and deals brokered by Spain and other international actors, which often focus on maintaining stability and economic cooperation with Morocco. However, these agreements frequently overlook the human cost and the long-term implications for the Sahrawi people, who remain displaced, marginalised, and without a clear path to self-determination. The situation highlights the need for a more nuanced approach that balances economic interests with human rights and the aspirations of the Sahrawi people.

A fragile path forward

The 2022 Spain-Morocco deal has calmed tensions, keeping Ceuta and Melilla secure and backing Morocco’s hold on Western Sahara. But by dodging the Sahrawis’ right to a homeland and Morocco’s dreams of reclaiming the enclaves, it’s a shaky truce. As economic and security cooperation deepens – evident in joint energy projects and migration controls, the human cost hits Western Sahara hardest. Migrants face deadly borders, 173,600 Sahrawi refugees languish in desert camps, and those in Morocco-controlled areas see their identity eroded by settlers and restrictions – all while the world watches silently. North Africa’s future greatly hinges on whether Spain and Morocco can face these tough questions or keep patching things up, leaving the Sahrawis to endure a slow, silent ethnic cleansing.

Tags:
Sovereignity
Stability